EXHIBIT A - What is Constitutional "Income?"

- 1 The premise of Exhibit A is that "income" defined in our modern-day language is quite different 2 than the original intent of the framers of tax laws and especially the income tax code. Over the 3 course of decades the terminology and definitions for income have been manipulated in the 4 public consciousness for less than honorable purposes. 5 The argument is stated thus: "Income" is not all that comes in and was never intended to be 6 wages, salary or compensation for labor. Income is a completely different category of creature, 7 which excludes "wages, salaries and compensation," and where Constitutional and legal 8 "income" exists, it must be taxed Constitutionally and legally. The right to work and obtain 9 "wages, salaries and compensation," is inalienable, and cannot be taxed contrary to original 10 intent of Congress, The People, or the Constitution. Taxation applies to specific isolated 11 categories of activities and entities, NOT the People's living. 12 The IRS creates a presumption in the minds of all Americans that all Americans are liable for 13 taxes on wages, salaries and compensation... 14 "Every presumption is to be in the oldest in favor of faithful compliance by Congress with the 15 mandates of the fundamental law (the Constitution-JTM). Courts are reluctant to adjudge any 16 statute in contravention of them. But, under our frame of government, no other places is 17 provided where the citizen may be heard to urge that the law fails to conform to the limits set 18 upon the use of a granted power. When such a contention comes here we naturally require a 19 showing that by no reasonable possibility can the challenged legislation fall within the wide 20 range of discretion permitted to the Congress. How great is extent that range, when the subject 21 is the promotion of the general welfare of the United States, we hardly need remark. But, despite 22 the breadth of the legislative discretion, our duty to hear and to render judgment remains as. If 23 the statute plainly violates the stated principal of the Constitution we must so declare." United 24 States v. Butler, 297 U.S. (1935). 25 Disputable presumption: "A species of evidence that may be accepted and acted upon when there 26 is no other evidence to uphold contention for which it stands; and when evidence is introduced 27 supporting such contention, evidence takes place of presumption, and there is no necessity for 28 indulging in any presumption. A rule of law to be laid down by the court, which shifts to the 29 party against whom it operates the burden of evidence, merely." Black's 6th Law Dictionary.
- This attachment provides such evidence against this "presumption."
- 31 "The general term "income" is not defined in the Internal Revenue Code." *US v Ballard*, 535 F2d
- 32 400, 404, (1976).

- 33 "...income; as used in the statute should be given a meaning so as not to include everything that
- comes in. The true function of the words 'gains' and "profits' (as defined in the code-JTM) is to
- 35 <u>limit</u> the meaning of the word 'income." S. Pacific v. Lowe, 247 F. 330. (1918).
- 36 "...Taxation on income is in its nature an excise entitled to be enforced as such" (in other words
- indirectly as a tax upon an optional exercise of privilege, and taxed uniformly across the country
- 38 to everyone.)
- 39 "Since the right to receive income or earnings is a right belonging to every persons, this right
- cannot be taxed as <u>privilege</u>."(Excise or "income" tax) *Jack Cole Company v. Alfred T*,
- 41 MacFarland, Commissioner, 206 Tenn. 694, 337 S.W.2d 453 Sup. Court of Tennessee (1960).
- In other words, income taxation is legally and constitutionally ONLY on privilege, i.e. Corporate
- profits (after expenses and salaries) and unearned income "from whatever source derived" 16th
- amendment, and is also ONLY on those serving in a public office or working for the
- 45 government.
- "A tax upon the privilege of selling property at the exchange,...differs radically from a tax upon
- every sale made in any place. A sale at an exchange differs from a sale made at a man's private
- office or on his farm, or by a partnerships because, although the subject matter of the sale may be
- 49 the same in each case, there are at an exchange certain advantages, in the way of finding a
- market, obtaining a price, the saving of time, and in the security of payments and other matters,
- which are more easily obtained there than at an office or a farm." *Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509*
- 52 (1899).
- 53 "Every presumption is to be in the oldest in favor of faithful compliance by Congress with the
- 54 mandates of the fundamental law (the Constitution-JTM). Courts are reluctant to adjudge any
- statute in contravention of them. But, under our frame of government, no other places is
- provided where the citizen may be heard to urge that the law fails to conform to the limits set
- upon the use of a granted power. When such a contention comes here we naturally require a
- showing that by no reasonable possibility can the challenged legislation fall within the wide
- range of discretion permitted to the Congress. How great is extent that range, when the subject is
- the promotion of the general welfare of the United States, we hardly need remark. But, despite
- the breadth of the legislative discretion, our duty to hear and to render judgment remains... If the
- statute plainly violates the stated principal of the Constitution we must so declare." United States
- 63 v. Butler, 297 U.S. (1935).
- 26 CFR 39.21-1 (1956).. Meaning of net income. (a) The tax imposed by chapter 1 is upon
- income. Neither income exempted by statute or fundamental law, nor expenses incurred in
- connection therewith, other than interest, enter into the computation of net Income as defined by
- section 21

- 68 26 CFR 39.22(b)-1 Exemption--Exclusions from gross income. Certain items of income
- specified in section 22(b) are exempt from tax and may be excluded from gross income. These
- items however, are exempt only to the extent and in the amount specified. No other items may be
- excluded from gross income except (a) those items of income which are under the Constitution,
- 72 not taxable by the Federal government;"
- 73 Today's regulations put it this way: CFR 1.61-1 (Current)
- Gross income. General definition. Gross income means all income from whatever source
- 75 <u>derived</u> unless excluded by law.
- The "excluded by law" clause refers to constitutional forms of taxation and all other applicable
- laws as set forth herein.
- 78 The IR Code defines "income" as:
- 79 Section 22 GROSS INCOME:
- 80 (a): Gross income includes gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or
- 81 compensation for personal service..."
- "Gross income and not 'gross receipts' is the foundation of income tax liability... The general
- term 'income' is not defined in the Internal Revenue Code... 'gross income' means the total sales,
- less the cost of goods sold, plus any income from investments and from incidental or outside
- operations or sources." U.S. v. BALLARD, 535 F2d 400 (1976).
- My gross income is NOT a "gain, profit or income," that is "DERIVED FROM" anything but my
- labor, which is NOT my "profit." Actual "gross income," as defined in IR Code, and in keeping
- with case law and Congressional records, is any "profit" or "gain" that is "derived FROM" my
- income. Example: I receive \$10,000 wage for service or labor provided. This is an equal
- 90 exchange, with NO "material difference" in the exchange (Material difference case law -
- 91 COTTAGE SAVINGS ASSN v. COMMISSIONER, 499 U.S. 554 (1991). My labor or service is
- equal in value to the payment (or other compensation) received. This is NOT taxable under law.
- I take this \$10,000, and invest it in some way, and receive a "profit" or "gain" FROM this
- 94 income I received, as interest, or what is termed "unearned income." I exerted NO personal
- labor, (which I own,) and received an actual "profit" or "gain" from the investment. THIS, and
- ONLY this "gain," is possibly taxable, but ONLY according to constitutional law across the
- country, and ONLY according to other personal tax liability defined in IR Code and the issues
- presented throughout this document. The actual principle amount is NOT diminished in any way,
- and ONLY the profit or gain "DERIVED FROM" the principle is possibly taxable. The tax is
- for the privilege of gaining MORE wealth, and the tax is for the functioning of government at the
- same time.

102 103	"Income Tax: A tax on the yearly profits arising from property, professions and trades, and offices." Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary 612 (1910).
104 105	Income tax: An 'income tax' is a tax which relates to product or income from property or from business pursuits." Levi v. City of Louisville, 30 S.W. 973, 974, 97 Ky. 394, 28 L.R.A. 480.
106 107	"The term 'income tax' includes a tax on the gross receipts of a corporation or business." Parker v. North British Ins. Co. 7 South. 599, 600, 42 La. Ann. 428.
108	My labor is my property which I am free to use and dispose of as I wish:
109	"Among these unalienable rights, as proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence, is the right
110	of men to pursue their happiness, by which is meant, the right to pursue any lawful business or
111	vocation, in any manner not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, which may increase
112	their prosperity or develop their faculties, so as to give them their highest enjoyment It has
113	been well said that, the property which every man has in his own labor, as it is the original
114	foundation of all other property, (without said property, ((labor or service, which allows the
115	receipt of money FROM which someone may produce "income")) so it is the most sacred and
116	inviolableto hinder his employing, in what manner he thinks proper, without injury to his
117	neighbor, is a plain violation of the most sacred property." Butchers' Union Co. V. Crescent City,
118	CO., 111 U.S. 746, 757 (1883).
119	"A man is free to lay hand upon his own property. To acquire and possess property is a right, not
120	a privilege The right to acquire and possess property cannot alone be made the subject of an
121	excise nor, generally speaking, can an excise be laid upon the mere right to possess the fruits
122	thereof, as that right is the chief attribute of ownership." Jerome H. Sheip Co. v. Amos, 100 Fla.
123	863, 130 So. 699, 705 (1930).
124	"Can be said with any degree of sense were just as that the property which a man has been his
125	labor which is the foundation of all property in which is the only capital of so large majority of
126	the citizens of our country is not property; or, at least, not that character of property which can
127	demand boom of protection from the government? We think not." Jones v. Leslie, 112 P. 81
128	(1910).
129	"Though the earth and all inferior creatures the common to all men, that every man has a
130	property in his own person; this no Body has any right to but himself. The labor of his body and
131	the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his." John Locke, "2nd Treatise of government
132	(1690), Sec. 27.
133	"Property is everything which has an exchangeable value, in the right of property includes the

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power to dispose of that according to the will of the owner. Labor is property, and as such merits

protection. The right to make it available is next in importance to the rights of life and liberty. It

136 137	lives to a large extend the foundation of most other forms of property, and of all solid individual and national prosperity." Slaughter - House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, at 127 (1873).
138	The issue of whether a man's labor is his actual property rests in the fact that a person's labor or
139	service has value, and that it can be exchanged for something of similar value.
140	"We all have the innate ability to earn income based on our natural intelligence and physical
141	strengththe income from the skills is in part to return to earlier investments in food, shelter, and
142	clothing." A. Parkman, "The Recognition of Human Capital As Property in Divorce Settlements,
143	40 Arkansas Law Review, 439, 441 (winter 1987).
144	In order to produce labor or service in exchange for wages or compensation, there must be a
145	reasonable amount of support structure such as food, shelter, clothing, health support, adequate
146	rest, reasonable amount of recreation, etc. Without these basic elements, the ability to produce
147	labor, wages, and such is impossible. Human energy in the form of labor and service is a
148	commodity. It is something that can be bought or sold for a price. Anything that has economic
149	value inevitably raises the question of who owns it. If I do not own my personal ability to labor
150	and produce, then who does?
151	"To a slave, as such, there appertains and can appertain no relation, civil or political, with the
152	state or the government. He is himself strictly property, to be used in subserviency to the
153	interests, the convenience, or the will, of his owner." Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, at
154	475 476 (1856).
155	To own slaves meant that their labor can be owned as a form of legal property or capital asset.
156	The principal of slavery is at work with anyone who is deprived under power and color of law of
157	the right to claim their labor as their property. Human labor has all the essential legal
158	prerogatives and attributes of property.
159	"In our opinion that section, in particular mentioned, in an invasion of the personal liberty, as
160	well as of the right of property, guaranteed by that Amendment (Fifth). Such liberty and right
161	embraces the right to make contracts for the purchase of the labor of others and equally the right
162	to make contracts for the sale of one's own labor; The right of a person to sell his labor upon
163	such terms as he deems proper is, in its essence, the same as the right of the purchaser of labor to
164	prescribe the conditions upon which he will accept such labor from the person offering to sell
165	it In all such particulars the employer and the employee have the quality of right, and any
166	legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interference of liberty of contract which no
167	government can legally justify a free land." Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, at 172-175
168	(1908).
169	"Included in the right of personal liberty and the right of private property are taking of the
170	nature of each is the right to make contracts for the acquisition of property. The chief among

171	such contracts instead of personal employment, by which in labor and other services are
172	exchanged for money or other forms of property. If this right be struck down or arbitrarily
173	interfered with, there is a substantial impairment of liberty in the long-established constitutional
174	sense. The right is as essential to the laborer as to the capitalist, to the poor as to the rich; for the
175	vast majority of persons have no other artists away to begin to acquire property, save by working
176	for money The right to follow any lawful vocation and to make contracts is as completely
177	within the protection of the Constitution as the right to hold property free from unwarranted
178	seizure, or the liberty to go when and where one will. One of the ways of obtaining property is
179	by contract. The right, therefore, to contract cannot be infringed by the legislature without
180	violating the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Every citizen is protected in his right to work
181	where and for whom he will. He may select not only his employer, but also his associates." "
182	Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, at 14, 23-24 (1915).
183	Thus, a contract for labor is a contract for sale of property;
184	"The time and labor provided by the employees of the Chattanooga city school system were
185	purchased with public funds and thus became property, with an easily determined value, which
186	belonged to the city. The appellant converted the proceeds of those public funds to his own use
187	to repay favors and a creating more comfortable home for himself and his girlfriend. The statute
188	was sufficiently clear to place the appellant, or any other public official, on notice that the
189	embezzlement of the labor of employees of the state of Tennessee or any County or municipality
190	therein, is a criminal act." State v. Brown, 791 S.W. 2d 31, 32 (1990).
191	"Property corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, visible or invisible, real or personal;
192	everything that has an exchangeable value." Blacks Law Dictionary, 1979 edition.
193	"We conclude that if one's gambling activities pursued full-time, in good faith, and with
194	regularity, to the production of income for a livelihood, and is not a mere hobby, it is a trade or
195	business within the meaning of the statutes which we are here concerned. Respondents
196	Groetzinger satisfied that test in 1978. Constant and large scale effort on his part was made.
197	Skill was required and supplied. He did what he did for a livelihood, though with a less than
198	successful result. This was not a hobby or a passing fancy or an occasional debt for amusement."
199	Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23 (1987).
200	In the above case, it clearly shows that someone who puts regular, consistent efforts into making
201	a living is engaged in a trade or business, NOT related to U.S. government employment, whether
202	they are employed by another party or were employed themselves. Concerning my own
203	employment, I have pursued my occupation of selling my labor, energy and skills on a full-time
204	basis, in good faith, continuity and regularity, representing a constant and large-scale effort over
205	many years, for the production of income for a livelihood, with skills being required and applied.
206	It is not a sporadic activity, a mere hobby, or an amusement diversion. These very facts, being

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applied to all Americans across the country, should, at the very least, allow each and every one

209	in making a living.
210 211 212	Corporations and the self-employed have the luxury of deducting many expenses related to the production of income or profit, yet the common employee is not able to deduct one penny for expenses related to their production of income. This is an inequity that cannot be overlooked.
	or production of the second of
213	IR Code Sections 1001, 1011 and 1012 and their regulations, 26 C.F. R. Sections 1.1001-1(a)
214215	1.1011-1 and 1.1012-1(a), provide the method for determining the gain derived from the sale of property:
216	Section 1001(a);
217	"The gain from the sale or other disposition of property shall be the excess of the amount
218	realized therefrom over the adjusted basis provided in section 1011 for determining gain"
219	Section 1001(b);
220	The amount realized from the sale or other disposition of property shall be the sum of any money
221	received plus the fair market value of the property (other than money) received."
222	Section 1011:
223	The adjusted basis for determining the gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property,
224	whenever acquired, shall be the basis (determined under section 1012) adjusted as provided in
225	section 1016."
226	Section 1012:
227	"The basis of property shall be the cost of such property"
228	The cost of property purchased under contract is its fair market value as evidenced by the
229	contract itself, provided neither the buyer nor the seller were acting under compulsion in entering
230	into the contract, and both were fully aware of all of the facts regarding the contract. See
231	Terrance developmental Co. v. C.I.R., 345 F.2d 933 (19650; Bankers Trust Co. v. U.S., 518 F.2d
232	1210 (1975); Bar L Ranch, Inc. v. Phinney, 426 F.2d 995 (1970); Jack Daniel Distillery v. U.S.,
233	379 F.2d 569 (1967).
234	In other words, if an employer and employee agree that the employee will exchange one hour of
235	his time in return for a certain amount of money, the cost, or basis under Section 1012, of the
236	employee's labor is the pay agreed upon. By the same token, if an attorney, doctor or other
237	independent contractor agrees to perform a certain service for an agreed upon amount of
238	compensation, the value of the service to be performed is the amount agreed upon as payment for

of them to deduct all living expenses required to maintain their personal property which is used

208

239	the service.
240	In the case of the sale of labor, none of the provisions of Section 1016 are applicable, and the
241	adjusted basis of the labor under Section 1011 is the amount paid. Therefore, when the employer
242	pays the employee the amount agreed upon, or the professional is paid for his or her services,
243	there is no excess amount realized over the adjusted basis, and there is no gain under Section
244	1001. There being no gain, there is no "income" in the constitutional sense, and no "gross
245	income" under Section 61(1).
246	If one has no gain, one would not have sufficient "gross income" to require the filing of a federal
247	personal income tax return under Section 6012. Likewise, without gain, there can be no "self-
248	employment income," and one who is self-employed would not be required to file a federal
249	personal income tax return under Section 6017.
250	All other issues such as FICA tax, Railroad Retirement Tax, Federal Unemployment Tax, W4's,
251	etc., would be null because no gain or "income" has actually been realized.
252	"In principle, there can be no difference between the case of selling labor and the case of selling
253	goods." Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. at 558.
254	The sale of one's labor constitutes personal property. The IR Code specifically provides that only
255	the amount received in EXCESS of the fair market value of personal property upon its sale
256	constitutes "gain." 26 U.S.C. Sections 1001, et seq. Reading Court;
257	"It could hardly be denied that a tax laid specifically on the exercise of those freedoms would be
258	unconstitutional A state [or federal government-JTM] may not impose a charge for the
259	enjoyment of a right (working-JTM) granted by the federal Constitution." - Murdock v
260	Pennsylvania, 319 US 105, at 113; 480-487; 63 S Ct at 875; 87 L Ed at 1298 (1943).
261	The freedom and right to earn a living through any lawful occupation is EXEMPT from taxation
262	by the federal government! U. S. Supreme Court in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S.
263	233 (1936); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 56 S.Ct. 444 (1943); Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S
264	573 64 S.Ct. 717 (1944); Harper v. Virginia Bd. Of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 86 S.Ct. 1079
265	(1966).
266	"The statute and the statute alone determines what is income to be taxed. It taxes only income
267268	'derived' from many different sources; one does not 'derive income' by rendering services and charging for them." Edwards v. Keith, 231 F. 110 (2nd Cir. 1916).
269	"Citizens under our Constitution and laws mean free inhabitants Every citizen and freeman is
270	endowed with certain rights and privileges to enjoy which no written law or statute is required.
271	These are <u>fundamental or natural rights</u> , recognized among all free people That the right to
272	accept employment as a laborer for hire as a fundamental right is inherent in every free citizen,
273	and is indisputable" <u>United States v. Morris</u> , 125 F. Rept. 325, 331.

- Taxation Key, West 53 "The legislature cannot name something to be a taxable privilege unless
- it is first a privilege."
- 276 Taxation Key, West 933 "The Right to receive income or earnings is a right belonging to every
- person and realization and receipts of income is therefore not a privilege that can be taxed".
- The term [liberty] ... denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the
- individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life... and generally to
- enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
- happiness by free men... The established doctrine is that this liberty may not be interfered with,
- under the guise of protecting public interest, by legislative action..." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
- U.S. 390, 399, 400. referencing also Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36; Butchers' Union Co. v.
- 284 Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 4 Sup. Ct. 652; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct.
- 285 1064; Minnesota v. Bar er, 136 U.S. 313, 10 Sup. Ct. 862; Allegeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578
- 286 , 17 Sup. Ct. 427; Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 , 25 Sup. Ct. 539, 3 Ann. Cas. 1133;
- 287 Twining v. New Jersey 211 U.S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 14; Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. McGuire, 219
- 288 U.S. 549, 31 Sup. Ct. 259; Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 36 Sup. Ct. 7, L. R. A. 1916D, 545,
- 289 Ann. Cas. 1917B, 283; Adams v. Tanner, 224 U.S. 590, 37 Sup. Ct. 662, L. R. A. 1917F, 1163,
- 290 Ann. Cas. 1917D, 973; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 38 Sup. Ct. 337, Ann.
- 291 Cas. 1918E, 593; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 42 Sup. Ct. 124; Adkins v. Children's
- 292 Hospital (April 9, 1923), 261 U.S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L. Ed. --; Wyeth v. Cambridge
- 293 Board of Health, 200 Mass. 474, 86 N. E. 925, 128 Am. St. Rep. 439, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 147."
- My labor has a value, just as an employer or customer's money has value. I agree to my
- employer's wage or customer's money for my merchandise, and they agree to the labor or service
- I will "exchange" FOR that income. The process is an even exchange... (See COTTAGE
- 297 SAVINGS ASSN v. COMMISSIONER, 499 U.S. 554 (1991).
- 298 "The right to hold specific private employment and to follow a chosen profession free from
- unreasonable government interference comes within the 'liberty' and 'property' concepts of the
- 300 Fifth Amendment." Greene v. McEleroy, 360 U.S. 424, 492 (1959).
- This means the right to hold a job to generate a living is a "use" or a "holding of property for the
- 302 production of income."
- The exchange of labor for wages, salary or compensation, materially, has NO difference in
- 304 <u>value</u>, and therefore, there is nothing which is an actual "profit" that can be taxed. My labor
- cannot be valued LESS THAN the value of the money or wage paid to me for my labor or
- service, but this is what takes place when my wage is directly or indirectly taxed.
- Any exchange of my labor cannot be devalued below the value of the wage I received in order to
- attempt to show that I received a "profit," and possibly make me "liable" for a tax. My labor is
- valued EQUAL TO the wage I receive. Neither can the wage I make be counted in its entirety as
- a "profit," or this makes my labor or service worth nothing. I exchange my labor or service,
- 311 which I value exactly equal to the income I receive. There is NO material difference between the
- values for either my labor or service provided, and the income received FOR labor or service.
- I have the freedom and right to value my labor at any amount, and can, therefore, accept ANY
- amount of income as equal value to any labor or service I provide any party. Anything short of
- this that is taxed is clearly due to slave labor, and is theft by coercion, fraud and conversion, and

316 317 318	is clearly unconstitutional and against common law and case law. (See Attachments C and that the legal application of taxation against some citizen's are those that are in the "employee" of the IRS and U.S. Government - See 26 USC 3401(d)).
319	The following case law on "material difference" help to clarify "income" facts:
320 321	An example of ''no material difference'' in the exchange of labor for wage, salary or compensation:
322 323 324 325 326 327 328	John has hundred dollar bills but needs some twenty dollar bills. Mary has twenty dollar bills, but needs some hundred dollar bills. They agree to work for each other because John wants some twenties for his \$100 bills, and Mary wants some \$100 bills for her twenties. They agree to work for each other for the day. John agrees to give Mary one, one hundred dollar bill for the day, and Mary agrees to give John 5, twenty dollar bills for the day. At the end of the day's work for each other, they pay each other, or, exchange the bills. Question: Which one of them has made a "profit" from the exchange made?
329 330 331 332 333 334 335	When someone works for a wage or salary, they have agreed to exchange their labor for the money offered by the employer or customer. The person has agreed that their labor is worth whatever the employer or customer is willing to offer, (or is willing to accept the pay even though they value their labor at MORE than what is paid, thereby causing them a "material LOSS"). The process is simply an "exchange" of value, 1 to 1. There is NO "profit" being made by either at the point. The employee has his labor and needs cash, while the employer has cash, and needs labor performed.
336 337 338 339 340 341 342	If they both are considered to have made a "profit," just from the exchange of labor for money, in what way has this occurred? What "material difference" is there between the one, one hundred dollar bill, and the 5, twenty dollar bills? What "material difference" is there between the exchange of labor for cash? Are they not equal in value to each other? What "profit" has been made by labor or service provided in exchange for money or service? How has an actual profit occurred unless the actual labor or service is valued at zero value and ALL that was received was "profit?"
343 344 345	In the same way, EVERY "exchange" of labor or service for compensation, in whatever form, has NO "material difference" between either. To suggest otherwise, is to effectively make all labor and services of NO intrinsic value, and we become slaves through that process.
346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353	Another example: A company, receives money for services or products provided. This money is received and used by all those engaged as part of this enterprise. This cash or money is NOT considered a "profit" for this company because of expenses, costs of doing their work or service. After all wage expenses, material costs, and purchases to improve their business, the remaining money is, today, being classified as "income." However, the cash or money compensation or whatever that a private individual receives, IS considered a "profit" even though THEY, too, have costs and expenses in providing THEIR labor, which they spent money in various ways to be able to provide.
354 355 356 357	I have requested the IRS or any related agency to explain this "material difference" - See <i>COTTAGE SAVINGS ASSN v. COMMISSIONER</i> , 499 U.S. 554 (1991) for legal case law on "material difference" legal issue, and how "all that someone receives as wages or compensation is "profit" is a gross inaccuracy.

358	Case Law	Proving Labor is	property.	and wages.	salary and	compensation ((all income as terme
			P P J ,				(

today) is NOT subject to the income tax:

Legal and intended Definition of "Income," and law affecting Respondent's Actions;

- 361 Section 22 GROSS INCOME:
- 362 (a): Gross income <u>includes</u> gains, profits, and income <u>derived from</u> salaries, wages, or
- 363 compensation for personal service..."
- Gross Income Defined: Section 213. That for the purposes of this title (except as otherwise
- provided in section 233, [Gross Income Of Corporations Defined -JTM]) the term gross income-
- 366 (a) includes gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, and compensation for
- personal service (including in the case of the President of the United States, the judges of the
- 368 Supreme and lower inferior of the United States, and all other officers and employees, whether
- elected or appointed, of the United States, Alaska, Hawaii, or any political subdivision thereof or
- 370 the District of Columbia, the compensation received as such).
- 371 Said "gains, profits, and income" are all classified as being "DERIVED FROM" salaries, wages
- or compensation... This is in keeping with the original intent of the 16th Amendment and what
- the so-called "Income" tax was designed for... to tap the unearned "income" the wealthy had an
- 374 abundance of:
- "An unapportioned direct tax on anything which is not income would be unconstitutional." -
- 376 <u>C.I.R. v. Obear-Nester Glass Co.</u>, C.A. 7, 1954, 217 F.2d, 75 S. Ct. 570 348 U.S. 982, 99L.Ed.
- 377 764, 75 S. Ct. 870, 349 U.S. 948, 99 L. Ed. 1274.
- "When a court refers to an income tax as being in the nature of an excise, it is merely stating that
- the tax is not on the property itself, but rather it is a fee for the privilege of receiving gain from
- the property. The tax is based upon the amount of the gain, not the value of the property." C.R.S.
- Report Congress 92-303A (1992) by John R. Lackey, Legislative attorney with the library of
- 382 Congress:
- "The meaning of "income" in this amendment is the gain derived from or through the sale or
- conversion of capital assets: from labor or from both combined; not a gain accruing to capital or
- growth or increment of value in the investment, but a gain, a profit, something of exchangeable
- value, proceeding from the property, severed from the capital however employed and coming in
- or being "derived", that is, received or drawn by the recipient for his separate use, benefit, and
- 388 disposal." Taft v. Bowers, N.Y. 1929, 49 S.Ct. 199, 278 U.S. 470, 73 L.Ed. 460.
- "It becomes essential to distinguish between what is, and what is not "income"... Congress may
- not, by any definition it may adopt, conclude the matter, since it cannot by legislation alter the
- Constitution, from which alone it derives its power to legislate, and within whose limitations
- alone, that power can be lawfully exercised....[Income is] Derived--from--capital--the--gain--
- derived--from-capital, etc. Here we have the essential matter--not gain accruing to capital, not a
- growth or increment of value in the investment; but a gain, a profit something of exchangeable
- value...severed from the capital however invested or employed, and coming in, being "derived,"
- that is received or drawn by the recipient for his separate use, benefit and disposal-- that is the
- income derived from property. Nothing else answers the description.... "The words 'gain' and
- income' mean the same thing. They are equivalent terms..." Congressional Globe, 37th
- Congress 2nd Session, pg. 1531.

- 400 "The word "income" as used in this [16th] amendment does not include a stock dividend, since
- such a dividend is capital and not income and can be taxed only if the tax is apportioned among
- 402 the several state in accordance with Art. 1 Sec. 2, cl.3 and Art. 1, Sec. 9, cl. 4 of the
- 403 Constitution." Eisner v. Macomber. N.Y. 1929, 40 5.Ct 189, 252 U.S. 189, 64 L.Ed. 521.
- "[Income is] derived--from--capital--the--gain--derived--from--capitol, etc. Here we have the
- essential matter--not gain accruing to capitol, not growth or increment of value in the
- investment; but a gain, a profit, something of exchangeable value...severed from capitol however
- invested or employed and coming in, being "derived", that is received or drawn by the recipient
- for his separate use, benefit and disposal--that is the income derived from property. Nothing else
- answers the description...". [emphasis in original]... "After examining dictionaries in common
- use (Bouv. L.D.; Standard Dict.; Webster's Internat. Dict.; Century Dict.), we find little to add to
- 411 the succinct definition adopted in two cases arising under the Corporation Tax Act of 1909
- 412 (Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415; Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co, 247 U.S.
- 413 179, 185) "Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both
- 414 combined, provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of
- 415 capital assets..." Dovle v. Mitchell, 247 U.S. 179-185 (1920); Stratton's Indep. v. Howbert, 231
- 416 U.S. 339 (1913); So. Pacific v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330 (1918); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 US 189
- 417 (1920); Merchant's Loan v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 (1921).
- The claim that salaries, wages, and compensation for personal services are to be taxed as an
- entirety and therefore must be returned by the individual who has performed the services which
- produce the gain is without support, either in the language of the Act or in the decisions of the
- 421 courts construing it. Not only this, but it is directly opposed to provisions of the Act and to
- regulations of the U.S. Treasury Department, which either prescribed or permits that
- compensations for personal services not be taxed as a entirety and not be returned by the
- individual performing the services. It has to be noted that, by the language of the Act, it is not
- salaries, wages or compensation for personal services that are to be included in gross income.
- That which is to be included is gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or
- 427 compensation for personal services." The United States Supreme Court, Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S.
- 428 111 (1930)
- The original intent of the founders of the Constitution was NOT to tax wages or salaries of the
- people of the several states. The word "income" had a completely different meaning then,
- compared to what is presumed to be the meaning today. Not only Supreme Court Case law, but
- hundreds of Congressional Records of the time (as documented in the book "Constitutional
- Income: Do you have any?") clearly show what the "income" tax was understood to be:
- "The task of interpretation must therefore be to discover what was the meaning common to each
- of these terms at the time the Constitution was adopted." Francis W. Bird, Constitutional Aspects
- of the Federal Tax on the Income of Corporations, 24 Harvard Law Review 31, 32 (1911).
- "The Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in
- their normal and ordinary [meaning] as distinguished from [their] technical meaning; where the
- intention is clear there is no room for construction and no excuse for interpolation or addition."
- 440 United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1930).
- "The Treasury cannot by interpretive regulations, make income of that which is not income
- within the meaning of revenue acts of Congress, nor can Congress, without apportionment, tax as

- income that which is not income within the meaning of the 16th Amendment." Helvering v.
- 444 Edison Bros. Stores, 133 F2d 575. (1943)
- "It is not a function of the United States Supreme Court to sit as a super-legislature and create
- statutory distinctions where none were intended. " American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 US
- 447 63, 71 L Ed 2d 748, 102 S Ct. 1534 (1982)
- "...income; as used in the statute should be given a meaning so as not to include everything that
- comes in. The true function of the words "gains" and "profits" is to limit the meaning of the word
- 450 "income." S. Pacific v. Lowe, 247 F. 330. (1918)
- Gains, profits, and income all relate back to one another as being equal, and quite distinct from
- "wages and salaries." Working for wages or salaries or other compensation to provide for family
- and livelihood were NOT "income" nor intended to be taxed. Such taxation diminishes the
- ability to provide for "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of happiness," and diminishes wealth...
- diminishes the "principle" and therefore makes one poorer because of it.
- 456 "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of
- political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish
- 458 them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty and property, to
- free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may
- not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections." West Virginia State
- Board of Education v. Barnette 319 U.S. 623
- Such property was NOT to be taxes, but the "gains, profits, and income" from such property
- WAS available to be taxed, but ONLY according to Constitutional law.
- "...we are of the opinion that there is a clear distinction in this particular between an individual
- and a corporation, and that the latter has no right to refuse to submit its books and papers for an
- examination at the suit of the state. The individual may stand upon his constitutional rights as a
- citizen. He is entitled to carry on his private business in his own way. His power to contract is
- unlimited. He owes no duty to the state or to his neighbors to divulge his business, or to open his
- doors to an investigation, so far as it may tend to criminate him. He owes no such duty to the
- state, since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his life and property. His
- 471 rights are such as existed by the law of the land long antecedent to the organization of the state,
- and can only be taken from him by due process of law, and in accordance with the Constitution.
- 473 He owes nothing to the public so long as her does not trespass upon their rights." Hale v. Henkel,
- 474 201 U.S. 74 (1905):
- 475 "Privilege" was what "could" be taxed by the "income" tax. Such privilege was NOT the
- 476 "RIGHT" to work. "Right" and "privilege" are two distinctly different things.
- 477 It was not the intention of the American people to tax the wages and salaries of the working man,
- but ONLY to reach the "gains, profits and unearned income" of the country... something that was
- fought by big business and the wealthy of the country, and something which most people in the
- 480 nation did NOT have...
- "We are bound to interpret the Constitution in the light of the law as it existed at the time it was
- 482 adopted." Mattox v. U.S. 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895).
- 483 "For 1936, taxable income tax returns filed represented only 3.9% of the population," and, "The

484	largest	portion	of (consumer i	ncomes	in t	he	United	States	is	not	sub	ject to	income	taxatio	n.

- likewise, only a small proportion of the population of the United States is covered by the income
- 486 tax." Treasury Department's Division of Tax Research publication, 'Collection at Source of the
- 487 Individual Normal Income Tax,' 1941."
- Are we to believe that only 3.9% of the entire population of America worked for a living,
- making wages and salaries in 1936? Despite the incorrect definition for the word "income," the
- Treasury Department clearly shows how "incomes," while mis-defined, also shows that wages
- and salaries (what they believed to be income) were not yet the focus of "income" taxes.
- Constitutional income" means what We the People say it Means. Any word or term used in the
- Constitution has the meaning the People intended that word or term to mean at the time the
- Constitution was ratified. Or, in the case of an amendment to the Constitution, we use the words
- therein as the American People understood them to mean at the time the amendment was
- (supposedly) ratified by the several States. To understand what the meaning of the word
- "income" is, we must examine the history of income taxes in America prior to the ratification of
- 498 the 16th Amendment.
- "Under the Internal Revenue Act of 1954 if there is no gain, there is no income." 26 U.S.C.A.
- 500 '54, Sec. 61(a).
- "There must be gain before there is 'income' within the 16th Amendment." U.S.C.A. Const. Am
- 502 16.
- "The true function of the words 'gains' and profits' is to limit the meaning of the word 'income'
- and to show its use only in the sense of receipts which constituted an accretion to capital. So the
- function of the word 'income 'should be to limit the meaning of the words 'gains' and profits."
- Southern Pacific v. Lowe. Federal Reporter Vol. 238 pg. 850. See also, Walsh v. Brewster.
- 507 Conn. 1921, 41 S.Ct. 392, 255 U.S. 536, 65 L.Ed. 762..
- 508 "I assume that every lawyer will agree with me that we can not legislatively interpret meaning of
- the word "income." That is a purely judicial matter... The word "income" has a well defined
- meaning before the amendment of the Constitution was adopted. It has been defined in all of the
- courts of this country [as gains and profits-PH]... If we could call anything that we pleased
- income, we could obliterate all the distinction between income and principal. The Congress can
- not affect the meaning of the word "income" by any legislation whatsoever... Obviously the
- people of this country did not intend to give to Congress the power to levy a direct tax upon all
- the property of this country without apportionment." 1913 Congressional Record, pg. 3843, 3844
- 516 Senator Albert B. Cummins.
- Compensation:"...Giving an equivalent or substitute of equal value...giving back an equivalent in
- either money, which is but the measure of value..." Black's Law Dictionary.
- "...Reasonable compensation for labor or services rendered is not profit..." Laureldale Cemetery
- 520 Assc. v. Matthews. 47 Atlantic 2d. 277 (1946).
- "All are agreed that an income tax is a "direct tax" on gain or profits..." Bank of America
- 522 National T. & Sav. Ass'n. V United States, 459 F.2d 513, 517 (Ct.Cl 1972).
- "The phraseology of form 1040 is somewhat obscure...But it matters little; the statute and the
- statute alone determines what is income to be taxed. It taxes income 'derived' from many

525	different sources; one does not 'derive income' by rendering services and charging for them." -
526	Edwards v. Keith, 231 Fed. Rep. (Note: Webster's Dictionary defines "derived" as: "to obtain
527	from a parent substance." The property or compensation would be the parent substance and the
528	"gain or profit" would be a separate "derivative" obtained from the substance (property or
529	compensation). "From" means "to show removal or separation.")

- Public Salary Act of 1939, TITLE I SECTION 1. "22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code relating
- to the definition of 'gross income,' is amended after the words 'compensation for personal service'
- the following: including personal service as an officer or employee of a State, or any political
- subdivision thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing.
- The Preface of 1939 Internal Revenue Code states:
- "The whole body of internal revenue laws in effect January 2 1939, therefore, has its ultimate
- origin in 164 separate enactments of Congress. The earliest of these was approved July 1. 1862."
- "And be it further enacted, that on and after the first day of August, 1862 there shall be levied
- collected and paid on all salaries of officers, or payments to persons in the civil military, naval,
- other employment or service of the United States, including senators and representatives and
- delegates in Congress..."
- This law was later expanded to include, "employees of the United States, the District of
- Columbia or any agency or instrumentality thereof whether elected or appointed." The Public
- Salary Act of 1939 added employee and officers of the States and Municipalities as subjects of
- 544 the income tax.
- "Income" as the framers and people of America understood it, was not "all that comes in"... (S.
- Pacific v. Lowe, 247 F. 330. (1918)) but was, as The United States Supreme Court, Lucas v.
- Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930), above, states it, was "gains and profits DERIVED FROM salaries,
- wages, etc." In other words, wages were NOT income, but interest FROM wages sitting in a
- bank, or profit received FROM property, or interest FROM a loan to another WAS "INCOME"...
- but was STILL subject to Constitutional law in HOW that "income" is taxed.
- "Simply put, pay from a job is a 'wage,' and wages are not taxable. Congress has taxed
- INCOME, not compensation (wages and salaries)." Conner v. U.S. 303 F Supp. 1187 (1969).
- Sec. 30 Judicial Definitions of income. By the rule of construction, noscitur a sociis, however,
- the words in this statute must be construed in connection with those to which it is joined,
- namely, gains and profits; and it is evidently the intention, as a general rule, to tax only the profit
- of the taxpayer, not his whole revenue." Roger Foster, A treatise on the Federal Income Tax
- 557 Under the Act of 1913, 142.

558

Congressional Testimony:

- Mr. Heflin. "An income tax seeks to reach the unearned wealth of the country and to make it pay
- its share." 45 Congressional Record. 4420 (1909) Mr. Heflin. "But sir, when you tax a man on
- his income, it is because his property is productive., He pays out of his abundance because he
- has got the abundance." 45 Congressional Record. 4423 (1909)
- "There can be no tax upon a man's right to live and earn his bread by the sweat of his brow."
- O'Connell v. State Bd. of Equalization, 25 P.2d 114, 125 (Mont. 1933).

- "...Every man has a natural right to the fruits of his own labor, as generally admitted; and no
- other person can rightfully deprive him of those fruits; and appropriate them against his will..."
- The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66, 120.
- "So that, perhaps, the true question is this: is income property, in the sense of the constitution,
- and must it be taxed at the same rate as other property? The fact is, **property is a tree; income is**
- 570 **the fruit**; labour is a tree; income the fruit; capital, the tree; income the fruit. The fruit, if not
- consumed (severed) as fast as it ripens, will germinate from the seed...and will produce other
- trees and grow into more property; but so long as it is fruit merely, and plucked (severed) to eat...
- it is no tree, and will produce itself no fruit." Waring v. Citv of Savennah. 60 Ga. 93, 100 (1878).
- 574 (Emphasis added).
- Louisiana Civil Code: "Art. 551. Kinds of fruits; "Fruits are things that are produced by or
- derived from another thing **without diminution of its substance**. There are two kinds of fruits;
- 577 natural fruits and civil fruits. Natural fruits are products of the earth or of animals. Civil fruits are
- revenues derived from a thing by operation of law or by reason of a juridical act, such as rentals,
- interest, and certain corporate distributions." (Emphasis added).
- The point being that "income" is something which comes FROM the "tree," or "wages..."
- Interest derived FROM wages.
- "The right to labor and to its protection from unlawful interference is a constitutional as well as a
- common-law right. Every man has a natural right to the fruits of his own industry." 48 Am Jur
- 584 2d. 2, Page 80.
- The poor man or the man in moderate circumstances does not regard his wages or salary as an
- income that would have to pay its proportionate tax under this new system." Gov. A.E. Wilson
- on the Income Tax (16th) Amendment, N.Y. Times, Part 5, Page 13, February 26, 1911.
- "As has been repeatedly remarked, the corporation tax act of 1909 was not intended to be and is
- not, in any proper sense, an income tax law. This court had decided in the Pollock case that the
- income tax law of 1894 amounted in effect to a direct tax upon property, and was invalid
- because not apportioned according to populations, as prescribed by the Constitution. The act of
- 592 1909 avoided this difficulty by imposing not an income tax [direct], but an excise tax [indirect]
- upon the conduct of business in a corporate capacity, measuring however, the amount of tax by
- the income of the corporation". Stratton's Independence, LTD. v. Howbert, 231 US 399, 414
- 595 (1913).
- The legislature has no power to declare as a privilege and tax for revenue purposes, occupations
- that are of common right" Sims vs. Ahrens, 167 Ark. 557; 271 S.W. 720, 730-733 (1925).
- 598 "An examination of these and other provisions of the Act (Corporation Excise Tax Act of August
- 5, 1909) make it plain that the legislative purpose was not to tax property as such, or the mere
- conversion of property, but to tax the conduct of the business of corporations organized for profit
- upon the gainful returns from their business operations." Doyle v. Mitchell Bros., 247 U.S. 179,
- 602 183 (1918).
- "Nothing can be clearer than that what the constitution intended to guard against was the
- exercise by the general government of the power of directly taxing persons and property within
- any state through a majority made up from the other states." Pollock vs. Farmers' Loan and Trust

606 Co. on original intent, 157 US 429, 582 (1895).

"We have considered the act only in respect of the tax on income derived from real estate, and from invested personal property, and have not commented on so much of it as bears on gains or profits from business, privileges, or employments, in view of the instances in which taxation on business, privileges, or employments has assumed the guise of an excise tax and been sustained as such. It is evident that the income from realty formed a vital part of the scheme for taxation embodied therein. If that be stricken out, and also the income from all investments of all kinds, it is obvious that by far the largest part of the anticipated revenue would be eliminated, and this would leave the burden of the tax to be borne by professionals, trades, employments, or vocations; and in that way what was intended as a tax on capital would remain in substance as a tax on occupations and labor. We cannot believe that such was the intention of Congress. We do not mean to say that an act laying by apportionment a direct tax on all real estate and personal property, or the income thereof, might not lay excise taxes on business, privileges, employments and vocations. But this is not such an act; and the scheme must be considered as a whole."

Pollock, 158 U.S. at 635-637.

- **Guise**: "A superficial seeming: an artful or simulated appearance (as of property or worth). Webster's Third New International Dictionary.
- "We are of the opinion that a tax on the gross income of an individual is embraced by the words "capitation, or other direct tax," in the Constitution, and should be assessed and collected on the principle of apportionment and not of uniformity, and that the several sections of the Internal Revenue act imposing such tax are therefore unconstitutional. We are further of opinion that no decision of the Supreme Court of the United States precludes this view, or discourages the expectation that it will receive the sanction of the court. On the contrary, there are dicta and suggestions in the only decisions bearing upon the subject which tend to confirm the opinion we have expressed." 13 Internal Revenue Record 76.
- "It is obvious that these decisions in principle rule the case bar if the word "income" has the same meaning in the Income Tax Act of 1913 that it had in the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909, and that it has the same scope of meaning was in effect decided in Southern Pacific Co. V. Lowe 247 U.S. 330, 335, where it was assumed for the purpose of decision that there was no difference in its meaning as used in the act of 1909 and in the Income Tax Act of 1913. There can be no doubt that the word must be given the same meaning and content in the Income Tax Acts of 1916 and 1917 that it had in the act of 1913. When to this we add that in Eisner v. Macomber, supra, a case arising under the same Income Tax Act of 1916 which is here involved, the definition of "income" which was applied was adopted from Stratton's' Independence v. Howbeit, arising under the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909, with the addition that it should include "profit gained through sale or conversion of capital assets," there would seem to be no room to doubt that the word must be given the same meaning in all Income Tax Acts of Congress that was given to it in the Corporation Excise Tax Act, and that what that meaning is has now become definitely settled by decisions of this Court."
 - "...it [income] should include *profit gained through a <u>sale or conversion of capital assets'</u>. There would seem to be no room to doubt that the word must be given the <u>same meaning in all of the Income Tax Acts of Congress that it was given to it in the Corporation Excise Tax Act, and what that meaning is has now become <u>definitely settled</u> by decisions of this court. In determining the definition of the word "income" thus arrived at, this court has consistently refused to enter into the refinements of lexicographers or economists and has approved, in the definitions quoted,*</u>

- what is believed to be the commonly understood meaning of the term ['gains and profits'] which
- must have been in the minds of the people when they adopted the Sixteenth Amendment to the
- 653 Constitution..."Merchants Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka. 225 U.S. 509, 518, 519 (1923).
- "Before the 1921 Act this Court had indicated (see Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207, 64
- 655 L.ed 521, 9 A.L.R. 1570, 40 S. Ct. 189), what it later held, that 'income,' as used in the revenue
- acts taxing income, adopted since the 16th Amendment, has the same meaning that it had in the
- 657 Act of 1909. Merchants; Loan & T. Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 519, 65 L.ed. 751, 755, 15
- 658 A.L.R. 1305, 41 S. Ct. 386; see Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe. 247 U.S. 330, 335, 62 L.ed. 114,
- 659 1147, 38 S. Ct. 540." Burnet vs. Harmel 287 US 103.
- "... the Corporation Tax, as imposed by Congress in the Tariff Act of 1909, is not a direct tax but
- an excise; it does not fall within the apportionment clause of the Constitution; but is within, and
- complies with, the provision for uniformity throughout the United States; it is an excise on the
- privilege of doing business in the corporate capacity..."
- "The requirement to pay [excise] taxes involves the exercise of privilege." Flint v. Stone Tracey
- 665 Company, 220 U.S. 107, 108 (1911).
- By this decision, the Court stated that it would accept only one definition of "income" [under the
- 16th Amendment] and that any tax law that Congress wanted to pass under the authority of the
- 16th Amendment would have to use just that one definition of "income" and that definition was
- the one Congress used in the 1909 Corporate Tax Act! In short, the Court was telling Congress
- that since the 16th Amendment was a part of the Constitution, its meaning must be fixed and
- permanent, and since Congress could not be trusted to stick to one single definition, the Court
- was giving Congress one single definition with which to work if it wished its income tax acts to
- pass Constitutional scrutiny by the Court.
- "The obligation to pay an excise is based upon the <u>voluntary action</u> of the person taxed in
- performing the act, enjoying the privilege, or engaging in the occupation which is the subject of
- the excise, and the element of absolute and unavoidable demand is lacking." People ex rel. Atty
- 677 Gen. v Naglee, 1 Cal 232; Bank of Commerce & T. Co. v. Seater, 149 Tenn. 441, 381 Sw 144.
- "The individual, unlike the corporation, cannot be taxed for the mere privilege of existing. The
- corporation is an artificial entity which owes its existence and charter power to the State, but the
- individual's right to live and own property are natural rights for the enjoyment of which an excise
- cannot be imposed." Redfield v. Fisher, 292 Oregon 814, 817.
- "Yet it is plain, we think, that by the true intent and meaning of the Act the entire proceeds of a
- mere conversion of capital assets were not to be treated as income. Whatever difficulty there
- may be about a precise and scientific definition of 'income,' it imports, as used here, something
- entirely distinct from principle or capital either as a subject of taxation or as a measure of the tax;
- conveying rather the idea of gain or increase arising from corporate activities. We must reject in
- conveying rather the idea of gain of increase arising from corporate activities. we must reject in
- 687 <u>this case...the broad contention submitted in behalf of the Government that all receipts -</u>
- 688 everything that comes in are income within the proper definition of the term 'gross
- income'..." Doyle v. Mitchell Brother, Co., 247 US 179 (1918). (Emphasis added).
- Earnings: "That which is earned; money earned; the price of services performed; the reward of
- labor; money or the fruits of proper skill, experience, industry; ...derived without the aid of
- capital, merited by labor, services, or performances. Earnings are not income." Saltzman v. City

- 693 of Council Bluffs. 214 Iowa, 1033, 243 N.W. 161, 161.
- "Income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment and Revenue Act, means 'gains'...and
- in such connection 'gain' means profit...proceeding from property, severed from capital, however
- invested or employed and coming in, received or drawn by the taxpayer, for his separate use,
- benefit and disposal..." **Income is not a wage or compensation for any type of labor**. Staples
- 698 v. U.S., 21 F Supp 737 U.S. Dist. Ct. ED PA, 1937]. (Emphasis added).
- "There is a clear distinction between 'profit' and 'wages' or 'compensation for labor.'
- 700 Compensation for labor cannot be regarded as profit within the meaning of the law...The
- word profit is a different thing altogether from mere compensation for labor...The claim that
- salaries, wages and compensation for personal services are to be taxed as an entirety and
- therefore must be returned by the individual who performed the services which produced the
- gain is without support either in the language of the Act or in the decisions of the courts
- construing it and is <u>directly opposed to provisions of the Act and to Regulations of the Treasury</u>
- 706 Department..." U.S. v. Balard, 575 F. 2D 400 (1976), Oliver v. Halstead, 196 VA 992; 86 S.E.
- 707 Rep. 2D 858:
- Black's 3rd Law Dictionary: Income: "Income is the gain which proceeds from [the investment
- of capital received from labor, business or property;..." <u>Trefry v. Putnam</u>, 116 N.E. "Income is
- 710 the *gain* derived from capital, from labor or from both combined; something of exchangeable
- value, proceeding from the property, severed from the capital...and drawn by the recipient for his
- separate use..." <u>Eisner v. Macomber</u>, 40 S. Ct 189, 252 U.S. 189, L. Ed. 521, 9 A.L.R. 1570.
- 713 Goodrich v. Edwards, 41 5. Ct. 390, 255 U.S. 527, 65 L. Ed 758. "Income is something that has
- 714 grown out of capital, leaving the capital unimpaired and intact." Gavit v. Irwin. (D.C.) 275 F.
- 715 643, 645. "Income is used...in law in contradistinction [contrast, opposition] to *capital*." 21 C.J.
- 716 397. "Income, [gains and profits] ...is something produced by capital without impairing such
- capital, the property being left intact. and nothing can be called income which takes away from
- the property itself' Sargent Land Co. v. Von Baumbach, (D.C.), 207 F. 423, 430. (Emphasis
- 719 added).
- 720 Conner v. United States. 303 F. Supp. 1187 (1969) pg. 1191: "[1] ...It [income] is not
- 321 <u>synonymous with receipts.</u>" 47 C.J.S. Internal Revenue 98, Pg. 226.
- "Income, as defined by the supreme Court means, 'gains and profits as a result of corporate
- activity and profit gained through the sale or conversion of capital assets." Stanton v. Baltic
- Mining Co. 240 U.S. 103, Stratton's Independence v. Howbert 231 U.S. 399. Doyle v. Mitchell
- 725 Bros. Co. 247 U.S. 179, Eisner v. Macomber 252 U.S. 189, Evans v. Gore 253 U.S. 245,
- 726 Merchants Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka 225 U.S. 509. (1921).
- 727 U.S. Supreme Court GOODRICH v. EDWARDS, 255 U.S. 527 (1921) 255 U.S. 527
- GOODRICH v. EDWARDS, Collector of Internal Revenue.No. 663. Argued March 10 and 11,
- 729 1921. Decided March 28, 1921. Mr. Justice CLARKE delivered the opinion of the Court.
- 730"And the definition of 'income' approved by this Court is: "The gain derived from capital,
- from labor, or from both combined, provided it be understood to include profits gained through
- sale or conversion of capital assets." Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207, 40 S. Sup. Ct. 189,
- 733 193 (64 L. Ed. 521, 9 A. L. R. 1570)."...
- U.S. Supreme Court MILES v. SAFE DEPOSIT & TRUST CO. OF BALTIMORE, 259 U.S.
- 735 247 (1922) 259 U.S. 247 MILES, Collector of Internal Revenue, v. SAFE DEPOSIT & TRUST

- CO. OF BALTIMORE. No. 416. Argued Dec. 16, 1921. Decided May 29, 1922. Mr. Justice
- 737 PITNEY delivered the opinion of the Court."In that as in other recent cases this court has
- interpreted 'income' as including gains and profits derived through sale or conversion of capital
- assets, whether done by a dealer or trader, or casually by a non-trader, as by a trustee in the
- course of changing investments. Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 517-
- 741 520, 41 Sup. Ct. 386, 15 A. L. R. 1305"....
- "[1]... The meaning of income in its everyday sense is a gain... the amount of such gain
- recovered by an individual in a given period of time." Webster's Seventh New Collegiate
- Dictionary, p. 425 "Income is more or less than realized gain." Shuster v. Helvering, 121 F. 2d
- 745 643 (2nd Cir. 1941). "it [income] is not synonymous with receipts." 47 C.J.S. Internal Revenue
- 746 98, p. 226."
- "[2] Whatever may constitute income, therefore, must have the essential feature of gain to the
- recipient. This was true when the 16th amendment became effective, it was true at the time of the
- decision in Eisner v. Macomber (supra), it was true under section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue
- Code of 1939, and it is true under section 61(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. **If there is**
- 751 **no gain, there is no income**." Conner v. United States. 303 F. Supp. 1187 (1969) pg. 1191.
- 752 (Emphasis added).
- 753 **INCOME TAX**: Blacks Law Dictionary 2nd Edition: "A tax on the yearly profits arising from
- property, professions, trades and offices." -See also 2 Steph. Comm 573. Levi v. Louisvill, 97
- 755 Ky. 394, 30 S.W. 973. 28 L.R.A. 480; Parker Insurance Co., 42 La. Ann 428, 7 South. 599.
- "...I therefore recommend an amendment imposing on all corporations an excise tax measured by
- 757 2% in the net income of such corporations. This is an excise on the privilege of doing business as
- an artificial entity." President Taft, Congressional Record, June 16, 1909, Pg. 3344.
- While a "cash dividend" represents profit to the shareholder, and is thus "income" under the 16th
- Amendment, a "stock dividend" is not profit that has been "severed from capital" as is required
- to meet the definition of income under the 16th Amendment (ibid, Eisner).
- The Eisner quote featured above clearly illustrates that the apportionment clause of the
- Constitution is alive and well and has not been repealed or substantially altered by the 16th
- Amendment.
- 765 "[The Pollock court] recognized the fact that taxation on income was in its nature an excise
- entitled to be enforced as such unless and until it was concluded that to enforce it would amount
- to accomplishing the result which the requirement as to apportionment of direct tax was adapted
- to prevent, in which case the duty would arise to disregard the form and consider the substance
- alone and hence subject the tax to the regulation of apportionment which otherwise as an excise
- would not apply." Brushaber v. Union Pacific RR Co., 240 US 1 (1916).
- What the Brushaber court is saying is that any income tax, which has been structured as an
- excise tax, but is enforced in such a way as to effectively convert the tax to a direct tax, would
- cause the court to declare it unconstitutional due to lack of apportionment. What type of
- enforcement might effectively convert an excise tax to a direct tax? Once the demand for the tax
- money is unavoidable, and I can no longer avoid the demand and/or the collection of the tax,
- even when I have not engaged in any excise taxable activity, that is when the Executive Branch's
- enforcement of the tax has converted the tax, in substance, from an excise into a direct tax.

- The 16th Amendment only pertains to "income" in the form of dividends, patronage dividends,
- and interest from corporate investment. The 16th Amendment tax is upon the privilege (to
- shareholders) of operating a business as an artificial entity. The 16th Amendment tax is not upon
- "income"; the income is only the yardstick used to determine the value of the privilege, and
- hence the amount of tax to be paid.
- The 16th Amendment overturned the Pollock Decision by way of a constitutional amendment
- allowing income taxes on net income from real estate and personal property to be levied
- according to the rule of uniformity instead of the rule of apportionment.
- "Indeed, in light of the history which we have given and of the decision in the Pollock Case, and
- the ground upon which the ruling in that case was based, there can be no escape from the
- conclusion that the (16th) Amendment was drawn for the purpose of doing away from the future
- with the principle upon which the Pollock Case was decided." Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.,
- 790 240 U.S. 1, 18 (1916).
- Decided cases have made the distinction between wages and income and have refused to equate
- the two in withholding or similar controversies. See Peoples Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 179
- 793 Ct. Cl. 318, 332, 373 F.2d 924, 932 (1967); Humble Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 194 Ct. Cl.
- 794 944, 950, 442 F.2d 1353, 1356 (1971); Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. United States, 194 Ct. Cl.
- 795 920, 442 F.2d 1362 (1971); Stubbs, Overbeck & Associates v. United States, 445 F.2d 1142
- 796 (CA5 1971); Royster Co. v. United States, 479 F.2d, at 390; Acacia Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
- 797 United States, 272 F. Supp. 188 (Md. 1967).
- "It is a basic principle of statutory construction that courts have no right first to determine the
- legislative intent of a statute and then, under the guise of its interpretation, proceed to either add
- words to or eliminate other words from the statute's language." DeSoto Securities Co. v.
- Commissioner, 235 F.2d 409, 411 (7th Cir. 1956); see also 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction
- 802 § 47.38 (4th ed. 1984).

To further show the Respondents' confusing the income tax issue, we have the following:

- "At the very threshold of the case is the question whether an income tax is, under the provisions
- of the fourteenth amendment of the state constitution, a property tax, as the respondents contend,
- or whether it is an excise tax, as appellants contend. That question has recently been squarely
- presented to this court and has been definitely determined by it." Culliton v. Chase, 174 Wash.
- 808 363, 25 P.2d 81.

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- In that case, it was held that the state income tax law of 1932 (initiative measure 69, chapter 5,
- Laws of 1933, p, 49, Rem. 1933 Sup., SS 11200-1 et seq.) was unconstitutional and void.
- Although four members of the court dissented, it was held by the majority that, under our
- constitution, income is property, and that an income tax is a property tax, and not an excise tax.
- Nothing was said, or intended to be suggested, in any of the opinions that the court, as then
- constituted, had receded from its former emphatic declaration that, under our constitution,
- income is property, and that an income tax is a property tax." Jensen v. Henneford, 185 Wash.
- 816 209, 53 P.2d 607 (1936).
- The court in this case definitively ruled that income was property, and is being taxed "directly,"
- which forces such taxation to be apportioned according to constitutional provisions for direct
- 819 taxes.

However, sin	nce income has bee	n ruled as "pro	operty," and si	uch property is	obviously used	in the
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- production of income, under excise tax laws, such income can possibly become subject to excise
- taxation, of course, under the rules of uniformity ONLY. In addition to this, under 26 U.S.C 212,
- "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year" for the
- production of income and for "the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held
- for the production of income..." would be tax deductible from ANY income taxes we would
- otherwise be subject to.
- Despite the disregard for higher Court case law, this concession was made:
- "Of course, we recognize the necessity for expenditures for such items as food, shelter, clothing,
- and proper health maintenance. They provide both the mental and physical nourishment essential
- to maintain the body at a level of effectiveness that will permit it's labor to be productive. We do
- not even deny that a certain similarity exists between the 'cost of doing labor' and the 'cost of
- goods sold' concept." Reading v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 733, 734 (1978) case
- 833 "Excise: In current usage the term has been extended to include various license fees and
- practically every Internal Revenue tax except the income tax." Blacks Law Dictionary, Sixth
- 835 Edition, 1990.

More testimony and Case law:

- "The privilege of giving or withholding our money is an important barrier against the undue
- exertion of prerogative which if left altogether without control may be exercised to our great
- oppression; and all history shows how efficacious its intercession for redress of grievances and
- reestablishment of rights, and how important would be the surrender of so powerful a mediator."
- Thomas Jefferson: Reply to Lord North, 1775, Papers 1:225.
- "If money is wanted by rulers who have in any manner oppressed the People, they may retain it
- until their grievances are redressed, and thus peaceably procure relief, without trusting to
- despised petitions or disturbing the public tranquility." Continental Congress To The Inhabitants
- 845 Of The Province Of Quebec. Journals of the Continental Congress. 1774 -1789. Journals 1: 105-
- 846 13.

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- "Although the [enforcement] power provisions of the Internal Revenue Code are to be liberally
- construed, a court must be careful to insure that its construction will not result in a use of the
- power beyond that permitted by law." United States v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 488 F.2d
- 953 at 958 (5th Cir. 1974).
- "Under the facts and the law, the Court should satisfy itself, via sworn testimony of the
- Defendant, that the IRS is not acting arbitrarily and capriciously, and that there was a plausible
- reason for believing fraud is being practiced on the revenue. The Court is free to act in a judicial
- capacity, free to disagree with the administrative enforcement actions if a substantial question is
- raised or the minimum standard is not met. The District Court reserves the right to prevent the
- "arbitrary" exercise of administrative power, by nipping it in the bud." *United States v. Morton*
- 857 Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 654.
- "The IRS at all times must use the enforcement authority in good-faith pursuit of the authorized
- purposes of Code." *U.S. v. La Salle N.B.*, 437 *U.S.* 298 (1978).

360 361 362 363	"A statute must be set out in terms that the ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and comply with, without sacrifice to the public interest." <i>See Arnett v. Kennedy</i> , 416 U.S. 134, 159, 40 L. Ed. 2d 15, 94 S. Ct. 1633 (1974) (quoting <i>United States Civil Serv. Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers</i> , 413 U.S. 548, 579, 37 L. Ed.
364	2d 796, 93 S. Ct. 2880 (1973).
365 366 367	"Eight decades of amendmentsto [the] code have produced a virtually impenetrable mazeThe rules are unintelligible to most citizensThe rules are equally mysterious to many government employees who are charged with administering and enforcing the law." - Shirley Peterson,
368	former IRS Commissioner, April 14, 1993 at Southern Methodist University.
369 370	The Constitution and case law are clear; Petitioner is NOT made liable to pay taxes on wages, salary and compensation for work performed, and since the Respondent cannot
371 372	"Constitutionally" collect taxes themselves, depends on ignorance and "willful" compliance with what is believed to be "law." In any case, fraud is still involved with this scheme, violating
373	Petitioner's Constitutional Rights.
874	"Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary, they must be knowingly intelligent
375 376	acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and consequences." <u>Brady v. U.S.</u> 397 U.S. 742 at 748.
377	Paged upon the chave aggs law and other evidence. Detitioner believes beyond any doubt
377 378	Based upon the above case law and other evidence, Petitioner believes beyond any doubt that "income" is NOT "wages, salary or compensation," and therefore does not apply to
378 379	my wages, salary or compensation, and excludes me from being a "taxpayer," and any
380	liability for filing a 1040 form, or reporting wages, salary or compensation, or maintaining
221	records of same until proven otherwise in law